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Abstract 
This paper suggests a new approach towards online service provider liability which relies on duty of care.  
It proposes a concrete compliance framework for online platforms, borrowed from risk regulation, and 
modelled on anti-money laundering (AML) obligations in the financial sector.  First, the prohibition on 
obliging platforms to monitor content in a general manner under the E-Commerce Directive will be 
discussed.  On the face of it this may clash with a standardized requirement to filter for infringing content.  
Subsequently, the regulatory choice for such a duty of care standard will be explored.  It is argued that 
the largely self-regulatory proposals currently on the table may be ill fitted to achieve traction and 
accountability.  Finally, a three-tier compliance framework, modelled on the AML system and using a risk-
based approach, is proposed.  The pitfalls of such a highly automated compliance solution, which enforces 
complex legal norms, will also be touched on. 
Keywords: intermediary liability, duty of care, risk regulation, co-regulation, anti-money laundering, 
compliance technologies, algorithmic accountability, regulatory governance 
1. Introduction 
For over 20 years the internet has been revolutionising the way we do business, create and 
exchange information.  Information service providers (ISPs) who enable access to information on 
the internet and information uploaded by users and businesses have occupied a centre stage of the 
so-called platform economy.  We know these hosts as social networks, user generated content 
platforms, search engines or online marketplaces, to name but a few1.  Since the E-Commerce 
                                                          
1 Additional platform models are cloud services, collaborative economy platforms, news aggregators or online 
gaming platforms. 
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Directive (ECD)2 of 2000, these platforms have been enjoying wide-reaching liability exemptions 
for illegal content hosted on their servers if they act as neutral and passive information hosts and 
remove illegal content they are notified or otherwise aware of expeditiously.  This protection was 
initially provided in a bid to protect and promote an emerging and promising innovative economic 
sector.  The sector has indeed been growing successfully and is about to transform almost all 
sectors of our economy and society at large.  Powerful global internet corporations have emerged.  
But as is common with new, revolutionary opportunities they also disrupt and subvert more 
traditional sectors and open the door for new and old kinds of abuse.  As a consequence, there are 
now more and more voices, including the EU Commission, who call for internet intermediaries, 
or online platforms, to be more proactive in helping to prevent unlawful content and activity on 
the internet3.  However, it is proving difficult to adjust the current liability protections and to 
promote a transparent and consistent use of infringement prevention methods across this sector.   
The now powerful internet corporations have become used to the wide-reaching privileges they 
enjoy.  Moreover, lawmakers find it difficult to regulate in an area that is characterised by complex 
and fast moving technological advances and where algorithmic decisions taken by these platforms 
not only filter content, but also dynamically influence information access and display.  Meanwhile, 
curtailing the liability privileges unduly may negatively affect fundamental rights, such as freedom 
of expression or privacy.  Current attempts to regulate have therefore mainly relied on self-
regulatory mechanisms, which either encourage infringement prevention technologies, or propose 
to mandate their use by relying on agreements struck between private actors with little regulatory 
oversight4.  As will be shown below there are inherent deficiencies and risks with such an 
approach. 
This paper will draw on the concept of duty of care, to suggest a risk management standard for 
infringement prevention relying on co-regulation.  It will propose a concrete compliance 
framework for infringement prevention modelled on the existing compliance framework of anti-
                                                          
2 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, OJ L 187 2000. Articles 12 - 
15 
3 EU Commission, ‘Tackling Illegal Content Online Towards an Enhanced Responsibility of Online Platforms, 
COM(2017) 555 Final’. 
4 See Sub-section 3.1. 
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money laundering (AML) in the financial sector.  For this, the following section will discuss the 
prohibition of requiring intermediaries to monitor content for infringing activity on a general basis, 
which is part of the current liability framework for ISPs5.  There is a potential clash with a platform 
obligation to filter for infringing content as proposed in this paper.  The aim of this section is to 
critically assess the validity today of Article 15 ECD.  The third section will explore how such a 
due diligence system should be set up in a regulatory context given the powerful and new roles 
online intermediaries have become to play.  The role of soft law and co-regulation, such as 
technical standards, will be explored in more detail.  The fourth section will propose a conceptual 
design for a standardised duty of care, using a risk based approach to transaction monitoring.  The 
current EU and international anti-money laundering (AML) compliance framework mandated in 
the financial sector6 will be analysed with a view to applying it to a due diligence model for 
infringing content prevention.  It is the overall objective of this paper to advance the debate over 
online intermediary responsibilities beyond pure theoretical reasoning and explore some practical 
avenues.  As will be seen below, state actors and industry have made practical steps in suggesting 
self-regulatory models.  By exploring a co-regulated infringement prevention and removal 
solution, with public oversight over the technical decision-making process, this paper tries to 
remedy some of the perceived deficiencies of a largely self-regulatory system.  The new nature of 
the internet has become a breeding ground for innovative and experimental regulatory approaches7 
and this paper hopes to present such an approach.   
2. Infringement prevention, duty of care and general monitoring 
As a matter of brief introduction, I will quickly outline the current content liability framework 
applying to online platforms.  The below assumes that most of today’s online platforms would be 
                                                          
5 ECD (n 2). Article 15 
6 Directive 2015/849/EU of the European parliament anf of the Council of 20 May 2015  on the prevention of the 
use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing 2015. 
7 Christopher T Marsden, Internet Co-Regulation: European Law, Regulatory Governance and Legitimacy in 
Cyberspace (Cambridge University Press 2011) 8–14. And Wolfgang Kerber and Julia Wendel, ‘Regulatory 
Networks, Legal Federalism, and Multi-Level Regulatory Systems’ (2016) 13–2016 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2773548> accessed 6 April 2017.  This is just a snapshot of authors who discuss in more 
detail how the new nature of the internet challenges regulatory enforcement and calls for new, experimental self 
and co regulatory approaches. 
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defined as information service providers (ISPs), which means that they offer their services for 
remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of 
services8.  Under the ECD, ISPs enjoy far reaching immunities against infringing content on their 
servers, under certain conditions.  These liability exemptions are regulated in Articles 12 - 14, 
ECD: Article 14 applies to information hosts, or online platforms9.  According to this, ISPs enjoy 
these exemptions if they are passive in the sense that they play a mere technical and automated 
role with regards to the content on their platforms.  The idea is that this kind of hands-off 
involvement does not confer any control or knowledge over the information, including its potential 
illegality, shared by these information hosts.  Consequently, they cannot be held liable for any 
damages caused by hosting this content.  They would just need to act expeditiously to remove 
illegal content when notified of its existence.  In addition, they may be asked to prevent the notified 
content reappearing on its platform.  Article 15 ECD, on the other hand, ensures that ISPs cannot 
be asked to monitor platform traffic at a general level in order to prevent infringements.  Article 
15 ECD has been advanced by the CJEU but also national courts when limiting the obligations of 
ISPs for preventing or policing specific infringements, which are possible under Article 14 ECD10.   
So when arguing about whether intermediaries may be asked to be more proactive in preventing 
the occurrence of infringing content on their platforms, one inevitably needs to discuss Article 15 
ECD.  This Article is generally seen as an argument against widening infringement prevention 
obligations11.  As this paper will propose a solution which explores more proactive infringement 
prevention obligations, it could be seen as in conflict with the current prohibition to require general 
monitoring.  This paper submits that a critical re-evaluation of Article 15 ECD is needed: 1) the 
                                                          
8 ECD Art 2(a) refers to this definition of an ISP as laid down in Directive 98/34, Art 2 (1).  This directive was 
replaced by Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying 
down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information 
Society services 2015 para 1 (1).  The relevant Article is now 1 (1).  The majority of today’s online platforms would 
meet these criteria.  The recent judgement by the CJEU on Uber (Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi  v  Uber Systems 
Spain SL, C-434/15 [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:981 (CJEU).provides a useful delineation in this respect. 
9 ibid. Articles 12 and 13 apply to internet access providers, so called “mere conduits”, and to caching, respectively.  
10 Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v Netlog NV, C-360/10 [2012] 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:85 (CJEU).para 38; Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL 
(Scarlet Extended),  C‑70/10 [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:771 (CJEU). para 40, L’Oréal (UK) Ltd v eBay International AG, 
eBay Europe SARL, eBay (UK) Ltd and others, C-324/09 [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:474 (CJEU)., para 139 ; Tobias Mc 
Fadden v Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH, C‑484/14 [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:689 (CJEU). para 87  
11 See further below in this section 
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underlying economic assumptions for justifying it have changed, 2) the term “general monitoring” 
is ambiguous in view of the technologies available today12.   
In search for a justification of Article 15 the most forthcoming source from the Commission is its 
first report after the implementation of the ECD, published in 2003.  Here, the Commission gives 
mainly economic reasons for Article 15, such as protecting intermediaries against unreasonably 
high burdens incurred from checking millions of sites in the face of ineffective filtering 
technology. 13  The negative impact on freedom expression was seen as an additional risk resulting 
from ineffective filtering and blocking technology.  The predominantly economic justification of 
Article 15 has also been taken up in Courts, such as recently CG v Facebook14 in the UK.  Other 
sources see Article 15 mainly as a means to preclude the creation of actual knowledge and 
awareness, which would result from imposing more general proactive monitoring obligations, thus 
limiting the effectiveness of Articles 12 -1415.  The potential conflict of Article 15 with Recital 48 
ECD, which allows Member States to impose on ISPs duties of care as specified in their national 
law in order detect and prevent infringements, has also been noted16. Other documents from the 
drafting phase of the ECD as well as later reports post-implementation do not shine more light on 
this matter17.  In summary, the justifications for Article 15 seem to rest mainly on a desire to protect 
a nascent ISP sector from overly high burdens of manual verification.  It ensures the availability 
                                                          
12 Christina Angelopoulos, European Intermediary Liability in Copyright: A Tort-Based Analysis (Kluwer Law 
International BV 2017) 473–474. 
13 EU Commission, ‘First Report on the Application of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, 
in the Internal Market’ (2003) COM(2003) 702 final. p.14 and footnote 73 
14 CG v Facebook Ireland Ltd & Anor [2016] 2016 NICA 54 (Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland) [53, 55]. 
15 Alfred Büllesbach (ed), Concise European IT Law (2nd ed, Kluwer Law International ; Sold and distributed in 
North, Central and South America by Aspen Publishers 2010) 333. The same source notes that such a general 
monitoring would be likely to violate privacy rights under the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 Article 8(1). For a more detailed discussion see also Angelopoulos (n 12) 
107. 
16 Gerald Spindler, Fabian Schuster and Katharina Anton (eds), Recht Der Elektronischen Medien: Kommentar (2 
Aufl, CH Beck 2011) 1511. and Arno R Lodder and Andrew D Murray (eds), EU Regulation of E-Commerce: A 
Commentary (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 53. 
17 Thibault Verbiest and others, ‘Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries, Markt 2006/09/E’. p.4-5, This 
reports repeats the justification of the earlier European Commission report (n 13). EU Commission, ‘Online 
Services, Including e-Commerce, in the Single Market, A Coherent Framework to Boost Confidence in the Digital 
Single Market of e-Commerce  and Other Online Services, Accompanying the Document , SEC(2011) 1641 Final’ 
47–51.  
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of Articles 12 -14 with their focus on tying liability to actual knowledge of infringing activity 
gained ex-post, and failure to restrict it expeditiously.    
While general monitoring in itself is habitually identified for its potential to have a detrimental 
effect on fundamental rights, the usability of Article 15 for shielding against this abuse is 
inconsistently documented.  The European Court of Justice (CJEU) uses Article 15 in addition to 
a fundamental rights balancing when limiting ISP obligations to actively prevent infringements.  
In SABAM and Scarlet, the CJEU first states that Article 1518 protects against a general monitoring 
obligation.  It then engages in a separate balancing exercise19 between the intellectual property 
right and other fundamental rights – such as the right to conduct business (in conjunction with the 
Intellectual Property Enforcement Directive (IPRED)20), the right to protection of personal data 
and the right to impart and receive information.  Article 15 does not appear to play a direct role 
when conducting a balancing exercise of the fundamental rights for determining the scope of 
injunctions for infringement prevention.  Arguably therefore, not having Article 15 would change 
little in engaging in a successful balancing with fundamental rights when determining the scope of 
injunctions concerning infringement prevention.  By contrast, if for any reason a Court’s balancing 
exercise would arrive at an outcome that justifies general monitoring21, for example in the light of 
available technology, Article 15 would still prevent this outcome.  The EU Commission already 
formed a similar view by reasoning that the availability of perfectly effective and costless filtering 
technology would make Article 15 superfluous22.  While this is not the case today, it cannot be 
denied that filtering technology has advanced significantly since the early days of the internet.   
On a more technical level, and as can be seen from later reports by the EU Commission in 2007 
and in 201223, various Member States and national courts have continuously had difficulties in 
                                                          
18   SABAM v Netlog (n 10) [38]   Scarlet Extended (n 10) [40].  
19 SABAM v Netlog (n 10) [39]  Scarlet Extended (n 10) [41]    
20 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, OJ L 157 2004 para 3(1). 
21 keeping in mind that there is no clear definition of general monitoring; see also further below in this Section 
22 EU Commission, ‘Online Services, Including e-Commerce, in the Single Market, A Coherent Framework to Boost 
Confidence in the Digital Single Market of e-Commerce  and Other Online Services, Accompanying the Document , 
SEC(2011) 1641 Final’ (n 17) 50. 
23 Verbiest and others (n 17). EU Commission, ‘Online Services, Including e-Commerce, in the Single Market, A 
Coherent Framework to Boost Confidence in the Digital Single Market of e-Commerce  and Other Online Services, 
Accompanying the Document , SEC(2011) 1641 Final’ (n 17). 
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deciding when a specific infringement prevention turns general.  If a platform is held to prevent 
any kind of similar infringement (and case law has been differing on the broadness of the term 
“similar”), would all uploaded content not need to be filtered to ascertain that it did not constitute 
that similar infringement? And is that content verification process actually an act of monitoring?  
Maybe the technical dimension of filtering has evolved in a way that makes monitoring or content 
checking less intrusive?  This lack of clarity continues and has been repeatedly documented24.  The 
controversial proposal of the EU for a new Copyright Directive25 and the Audiovisual Media 
Services Directives (AVMSD)26 also show that the EU has not been able to obtain that clarity so 
far.  Moreover, these questions may be even more difficult to answer for new business models in 
the collaborative or platform economy27, which is characterised by more complex interactions in 
multi-sided markets28.  Big data, generated on platforms can now more readily be analysed and 
interpreted.  It is the question whether, for example, content recognition technologies, which 
process and analyse large amounts of content in an automated and more transient way constitute 
general monitoring29 and really pose a challenge to privacy30. 
                                                          
24 See for example the discussion regarding German case law in: Georg Nolte and Jörg Wimmers, ‘Wer Stört? 
Gedanken Zur Haftung von Intermediären Im Internet – von Praktischer Konkordanz, Richtigen Anreizen Und 
Offenen Fragen’ (2014) 16 GRUR 21–23. For a wider discussion on the matter: D Friedmann, ‘Sinking the Safe 
Harbour with the Legal Certainty of Strict Liability in Sight’ (2014) 9 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 
148, 152–155. and Peggy Valcke, Aleksandra Kuczerawy and Pieter-Jan Ombelet, ‘Did the Romans Get It Right? 
What Delfi, Google, EBay, and UPC TeleKabel Wien Have in Common’, The responsibilities of online service 
providers (Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2017) 11. and Angelopoulos (n 12) 100–107. but also the recent referral of 
the Austrian Supreme Court to the CJEU where the former asks for guidance on whether Art. 15(1) ECD conflicts 
with an injunction against Facebook to prevent defamatory language similar to previously notified comments, 
Glawischnig-Piesczek, v Facebook, 6Ob116/17b (Oberster Gerichtshof, Republik Österreich) and Glawischnig-
Piesczek, C-18/18 (CJEU) Pending Case. 
25 Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on copyright in the Digital 
Single Market, COM(2016) 593 final 2016. Article 13 
26 Proposal for a  DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL  amending Directive 
2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in 
Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services in view of changing market realities, 
COM(2016) 287 final 2016. Article 28a 
27 Yolanda Martinez Mata, ‘Bolkestein Revisited in the Era of the Sharing Economy’ [2017] Revista Electrónica de 
Estudios Internacionales 7 <http://www.reei.org/index.php/revista/num33/notas/bolkestein-revisited-in-the-era-
of-the-sharing-economy> accessed 12 September 2017. 
28 Olivier Sylvain, ‘Intermediary Design Duties’ 58 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2997141> accessed 19 September 2017. 
29 Angelopoulos (n 12) 473–474. 
30 Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale, ‘Slave to the Algorithm? Why a “Right to Explanation”Is Probably Not the 
Remedy You Are Looking For’ (2017) 16 Duke Law & Technology Review 18, 82. 
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The above demonstrates the dilemma of trying to define more concrete duties of care for detecting 
and preventing illegal activities, which can be reasonably expected from diligent economic 
operators.  However, such duties of care may not only be necessary in the face of diverging national 
interpretations31, but also because of the diversification of the intermediary sector and its ever-
growing importance.  Waiting for national courts to develop such guidelines out of the national 
transpositions of the ECD, or waiting for the CJEU to harmonise differing interpretations may not 
be a wise choice given the rapid speed of development in the sector. The principle of duty of care 
meanwhile is well anchored in both civil and common law traditions and used across a wide variety 
of legal fields.  In addition, the European legislator has provided an argument for Member States 
to explore duties of care under ECD Recital 48.  With this is in mind, the proposal offered in this 
paper assumes that a clear-cut decision on whether it conflicts with a present-day interpretation of 
Article 15 is not possible.  Moreover, it intends to highlight the obsolescence of the current liability 
framework32.  The technological progress with regards to content filtering and the economic status 
of the industry might justify a review of this 20-year old provision. 
3. Duty of care and the regulatory choice 
3.1. Current duty of care proposals – a review 
The idea of using the duty of care principle for obliging online platforms to participate in more 
proactive infringement prevention is not new.  Several authors have by now explored it.  Leistner33 
suggests compiling common principles of intermediary secondary liability derived from a 
repository of EU Member State case law where preventive measures where imposed on ISPs.  
These would be developed into a reasonable duty of care standard.    However, he is critical of this 
being a self-regulatory solution.  Helman and Parchomovsky34 and Verbiest/Spindler35 develop the 
                                                          
31 M Leistner, ‘Structural Aspects of Secondary (Provider) Liability in Europe’ (2014) 9 Journal of Intellectual 
Property Law & Practice 75. 
32 See also: Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon, ‘Internet Intermediaries As Responsible Actors? Why It Is Time to Rethink the 
E-Commerce Directive as Well.’, The responsibilities of online service providers (Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2016) 
<http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11948-015-9734-1> accessed 17 February 2017. Giancario F Frosio, ‘The Death 
of No Monitoring Obligations’ (2017) 8 J. Intell. Prop. Info. Tech. & Elec. Com. L. 199.       
33 Leistner (n 31) 88–90. 
34 Lital Helman and Gideon Parchomovsky, ‘The Best Available Technology Standard’ [2011] Columbia Law Review 
1194, 1225. 
35 Verbiest and others (n 17) 19–23. 
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idea of technology based safe harbours, where duty of care is tied to the use of state-of-the-art 
filtering technology.  Both suggest co-regulatory solutions, namely through standardization, to 
create statutory oversight over the development and use of the technology.  This is meant to ensure 
a level playing field between intermediaries and transparency over the decision-making 
mechanism (algorithm).  An obvious challenge to this solution is that, the wider the insights and 
participation in this filtering algorithm, the higher the likelihood that that the detection technique 
will be disclosed, opening the door for circumvention and abuse. Therefore an open source model 
for filtering technology, for example,  may be counterproductive in this area36.  Valcke et al look 
at the example of (self-regulatory) ethical codes drawn up by press associations or journalism 
councils as a possible model for a duty of care standard for ISPs.  Courts would take these standards 
as a yardstick when deciding on content liability cases involving ISPs.  In the US, Citron et al37 
meanwhile argue for a narrower interpretation of the liability exemptions provided under the 
Communications Decency Act38. That defence should only be available to Good Samaritans, i.e. 
those ISPs who already display a level of duty of care with regards to preventing and removing 
infringing content39.  That duty of care standard would be dependent on the nature and size of the 
platform activities and it would evolve in line with improvements in filtering and blocking 
technology40.  However, the authors leave open who would set that standard and who would assess 
it for its adequacy.  Lavi looks at social media and UGC platforms and proposes a context based 
differentiation of liability immunities41.  Waismann et al define a flexible standard of duty care for 
                                                          
36 Martin Husovec, ‘Compromising (on) the Digital Single Market? A Quick Look at the Estonian Presidency 
Proposal(s) on Art 13’ <http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2017/09/08/compromising-digital-single-market-
quick-look-estonian-presidency-proposals-art-13/> accessed 28 September 2017. 
37 Danielle Keats Citron and Benjamin Wittes, ‘The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans Section 230 
Immunity’ (2017) University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2017-
22 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3007720> accessed 18 September 2017. 
38 The Communications Decency Act (CDA) 1996, section 230 
39 Currently the CDA (section 23Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA)0) protects those ISPs which act as 
Good Samaritans against any liability for illegal content which they attained knowledge of due to their prevention 
activities.  Other ISPs, however, still enjoy unduly broad immunity even if they do not display any duty of care, 
according to Citron et al.  Citron argues for a reinterpretation of section 230, affording only those ISPs which act as 
Good Samaritans immunity.  Note that this Good Samaritan defence does not exist in the EU. 
40 Citron and Wittes (n 37) 17. 
41 Michal Lavi, ‘Content Providers’ Secondary Liability: A Social Network Perspective’ (2015) 26 Fordham Intell. 
Prop. Media & Ent. LJ 855. 
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search engines based on reasonableness. That reasonableness depends on cost, scope, potential 
harm and impact on fundamental rights42.  
The above examples show that there is an emerging opinion on how to involve ISPs more 
proactively in preventing and combatting third-party infringing content.  At the same time there 
seems to be less consensus over the type of regulatory intervention needed.  Beyond the above 
ideas there have been no concrete proposals on the compliance framework and risk management 
framework which could be used to implement such new duty of care standards.   
Looking at the regulatory choice, it appears that at least the EU Commission has set its mind on a 
mix of self- and co-regulation, relying heavily on industry-driven codes of conduct and 
information sharing.  In its recent proposals for a Copyright Directive43 the EU Commission 
mandates the use of filtering technologies.  It prescribes cooperation and information sharing 
between platforms and rights holders, and encourages best practice sharing between both parties.  
In the area of hate speech and terrorist content regulatory efforts rest on a (non-binding) code of 
conduct between major social media platform operators44.  The same is true for the fight against 
counterfeit products on the internet where the Commission merely facilitates stakeholder action 
based on a broad Memorandum of Understanding between major brand owners and e-commerce 
platforms45. In the amended AVMSD46 the Commission is arguably closest to a co-regulatory 
mechanism.  While it obliges video sharing platforms to take appropriate measures to protect users 
against illegal content, it also charges the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media 
Services (ERGA) with facilitating and advising during the creation of EU wide codes of conduct 
and best practice sharing.   
According to these proposals the actual influence over extent and nature of the infringement 
prevention and detection remains largely in the hands of platforms and industry stakeholders (such 
                                                          
42 Augustin Waisman and Martin Hevia, ‘Waismann Theoretical Foundations of Search Engine Liability’ (2011) 42 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 785. 
43 Copyright Directive Proposal (n 25). Article 13, Recital 38 
44 ‘European Commission and IT Companies Announce Code of Conduct on Illegal Online Hate Speech’ 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1937_en.htm> accessed 9 March 2017. 
45 ‘Memorandum of Understanding on the Sale of Counterfeit Goods over the Internet, 2011’. This Memorandum 
was renewed in 2016 as stakeholders agreed on common key performance indicators with regard to the fight 
against infringements. 
46 Proposed AVMSD amendment (n 26). Recital 37, Articles 4(7); 28a(7) & (8); 30a 
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as rightsholders).  Whether this type of intervention can still be termed self-regulation or is already 
co-regulation is open to wide discussion47.  There is an impressive array of typologies which look 
to classify various approaches to regulatory topics on the internet (e.g. content regulation, 
advertising, data protection, communication protocols, consumer protection) by their degree of 
involvement by state and industry actors48.  None of the current regulatory approaches and 
solutions in the EU include a formal element of mandatory statutory review, approval or audit of 
the solutions that are (to be) proposed by industry. They are therefore more likely to qualify as 
self-regulatory rather than co-regulatory solutions49.  The recent Communication of the EU 
Commission on tackling illegal online content on platforms50 is a tentative step in the direction of 
a co-regulatory mechanism as it encourages co-operation of platforms with law enforcement and 
for the first time and encourages explicitly the use of state-of the art filtering technology and 
technical surveillance technology.  The encouragement of platforms to create and publish 
transparency reports on notice and takedown actions51, and the desire to standardize these, could 
however be a useful foundation for mandatory, and co-regulated obligations.  It remains to be seen 
whether this approach will be followed by the Commission’s upcoming communication, 
announced for spring 2018, on fake news and online disinformation52.  The EU is currently 
analysing the self-regulatory measures it encouraged platforms to take in 2016 to fight hate 
speech53 and may propose legislative intervention.  
                                                          
47 LAJ Senden and others, Mapping Self-and Co-Regulation Approaches in the EU Context’’: Explorative Study for 
the European Commission, DG Connect (European Commission 2015) 20–31 
<http://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/327305> accessed 10 March 2017. Gerald Spindler and Christian Thorun, 
‘Die Rolle Der Ko-Regulierung in Der Informationsgesellschaft’ (2016) 6 MMR-Beil. 1, 5. 
48 Marsden (n 7) ch 2. Contains a comprehensive discussion of these regulation typologies for the internet. 
49 In Marsden’s (ibid 63, 227.) Beaufort scale of self- and co-regulation the current approaches would vary between 
level 2 – 5 and thus squarely fit within self-regulation (Level  11 would constitute “classic” co-regulation.  According 
to Spindler and Thorun (n 47) 8–9, these approaches would fit within their definition of self-regulation. The 
proposed approach in the AVMSD however is likely to be on the edge towards co-regulation, due to the quasi-
mandatory involvement of ERGA. 
50 EU Commission, ‘Tackling Illegal Content Online Towards an Enhanced Responsibility of Online Platforms, 
COM(2017) 555 Final’ (n 3). 
51 ibid 16. 
52 EU Commission, ‘Next Steps against Fake News: Commission Sets up High-Level Expert Group and Launches 
Public Consultations, IP/17/4481’ <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-4481_en.htm> accessed 22 
December 2017. 
53 EU Commission, ‘Commission Updates EU Audiovisual Rules and Presents Targeted Approach to Online 
Platforms, IP/16/1873’ <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1873_en.htm> accessed 22 December 2017. 
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3.2. Self- or co-regulation? 
There are several reasons for the current prevalence of self-regulatory models on the internet.  The 
most common, distilled from the variety of literature available on this topic appear to be: 1) the 
capability challenge faced by regulatory and enforcement authorities: the sheer amount of content, 
the unprecedented level of technical skills needed to understand internet businesses, plus the speed 
with which the industry develops54 lead to the state assigning more regulation tasks to the private 
sector; 2) the new cross-cutting nature of the internet and the emerging multi-sided platform 
economy requires new interdisciplinary and innovative, regulatory tools which can be a problem 
with regulators whose scope of activity is firmly prescribed55, 3) a cultural tradition in certain 
European countries56 or varieties of capitalism57 which is conducive to the emergence of self- and 
co-regulatory structures, especially in new and emerging industry sectors.  
At the same time, the risks of self-regulatory models for the internet are increasingly discussed58.  
With regards to content regulation a major criticism refers to a loss of democratic control and 
accountability over enforcement if the private sector is left to its own devices to regulate.  As 
powerful internet actors define and enforce their content policies largely based on commercial 
interest criteria and continue to enjoy far reaching immunities their activities risk being above the 
law59.  Nevertheless, these companies need to and will react to local regulators and cultural 
sensibilities regarding for example offensive material.  However, with the current protection they 
may be able to choose and pick, and alternatively claim ignorance over the existence of the content, 
                                                          
54 Jason Freeman, ‘Consumer Legislation and E-Commerce Challenges’ (2015) 2 Rivista Italiana di Antitrust/Italian 
Antitrust Review 80 <http://iar.agcm.it/article/view/11380> accessed 19 September 2017. Julie E Cohen, ‘The 
Regulatory State in the Information Age’ (2016) 17 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 369. Cohen shows how “infoglut” 
and fast paced technological change have outpaced regulatory capacities. Spindler and Thorun (n 47) 6. 
55 Cohen (n 54) 375–387. Frank Pasquale, ‘Platform Neutrality: Enhancing Freedom of Expression in Spheres of 
Private Power’ (2016) 17 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 487, 496.  
56 Senden and others (n 47). This study identifies the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and to some extent Italy with 
strong traditions in co- and self-regulatory practices.  
57 Marsden (n 7) 67–70. Marsden cites Rhinish and Scandinavian capitalism as conducive to co- and self-regulation, 
and outlines marked differences to US regulatory styles. 
58 Co-regulation, depending on definition and the degree of involvement of state actors, is more ambivalently 
discussed than self-regulation.  In fact co-regulation is both seen as suitable remedy to self-regulation (Spindler 
and Thorun (n 47). Marsden (n 7) ch 8.; Florian Saurwein, Natascha Just and Michael Latzer, ‘Governance of 
Algorithms: Options and Limitations’ (2015) 17 info 35, 42.) 
59 Pasquale (n 55) 496. 
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or overzealously remove it following a risk and cost benefit analysis60.  This trend is exacerbated 
by new, dynamic gatekeeping roles of platforms the effects of which are not yet fully understood61.  
These gatekeeping mechanisms may affect different users in a different way and diffuse an 
understanding of their real impact.  They are however ultimately driven by commercial interests 
to optimise network effects, attract traffic and lock-in old and new users62.  They therefore 
compound concerns over market dominance related to new gatekeeping powers63, while protecting 
opaque and inadequate content management activities.   
These trends have led to renewed calls for stronger state oversight through co-regulatory 
arrangements64.  The debate over a review of the intermediary liability regime is directly related 
to this.  As discussed in the previous section, the thrust of the debate should be to forego or relax 
the distinction between specific and general monitoring, and “passive” and “active” hosts and 
concentrate on reasonable duties of care.  It is clear immediately that the debate on duty of care 
really is about prescribing or bringing to light activities that online platforms need to perform as 
diligent economic operators.  The call for duties of care, whatever their design, goes hand in hand 
in with demands for publicly controlled governance and transparency common to other economic 
areas faced with similar transformation caused by new technological disruption and information 
management.  Examples are the financial industry, environmental management, or technical and 
safety requirements concerning products.65.   
Where the state tries to gain more regulatory control it needs to counter the pressures which have 
previously forced the prevalence of self-regulatory models mentioned above.  The complexities 
involved in overseeing these areas have led to a demand for new governance models.  Regulators 
must be able to understand and keep pace with the new institutional self-regulatory models that 
have arisen out of these industries.  These models are characterised by standard and norm setting 
                                                          
60 ibid 497. 
61 Natali Helberger, Katharina Kleinen-von Königslöw and Rob van der Noll, ‘Regulating the New Information 
Intermediaries as Gatekeepers of Information Diversity’ (2015) 17 info 50. According to this typical gatekeeping 
features are for example content personalization, enhanced connectivity features or differentiated user rights. 
62 Sylvain (n 28) 59. 
63 Cohen (n 54) 376–378. 
64 Saurwein, Just and Latzer (n 58) 40–42. 
65 Cohen (n 54) 395. 
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through informal procedures, managed by professional and technical expertise networks66.  
Therefore, to merely “be part of the process” and facilitate self-regulatory efforts characterised for 
example by best practice and code of conduct facilitation is not enough.  Regulatory activity needs 
to move further, into the sphere of auditing, standard setting, compliance reporting67 and decisional 
accountability68.  The latter concepts acknowledge that in these information and technology driven 
industries, which require complex decision making, legal compliance also entails complex 
decisions.  Traditional rules-based compliance is too static and ill fitted to achieve desired policy 
outcomes.   
Decisional accountability means then that regulatory risk management is being embedded in the 
technology and the algorithm itself69. This approach is not always and necessarily geared towards 
achieving 100% legal compliance.  Instead it forces the regulated entity to demonstrate that its 
technology choices were sufficiently informed by regulatory requirements.  The emphasis is on 
good, responsible and transparent decision making.  It enables the regulator to have constant 
oversight and intervene as necessary70.  This means however, that regulators also need to become 
more technical and at least be able to audit and assess algorithms and complex control software.  
Meanwhile there is a need to continue to involve sound human judgement at critical points of the 
algorithmic decision making to counter the institutionalization of risk measurement71. 
This kind of regulatory governance system could be used for reasonable duty of care standards 
around content regulation.  In fact, and as detailed above, platforms are making these kinds of 
decisions already and enforce the law, albeit largely unfettered from regulatory oversight.  We are 
                                                          
66 ibid. 
67 ibid 403. 
68 Kenneth A Bamberger, ‘Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age’ (2009) 88 Tex. L. Rev. 
669, 684. 
69 ibid 684–685. 
70 This has led to a boom in the use of automated compliance systems, which are often embedded in companies 
overall risk management structures, for example as Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC) systems.  Prominent 
examples are: the financial services sector, where automated compliance systems respond to Basle II, Sarbanes-
Ox, or anti-money laundering requirements); manufacturing, with complex environmental and health and safety 
reporting requirements; export and trade compliance reporting obligations. 
71 Bamberger (n 68) 712, 736–737. This may lead to inflexibility in the risk monitoring process and neglect of 
(qualitative) shifts in risk exposure 
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therefore looking for a technical compliance framework, which would translate duty of care into 
risk-based, minimum prevention and takedown requirements.   
4. Risk management AML style  
4.1. Why use the AML framework? 
This Section analyses the regulatory framework of anti-money laundering and counter terrorist 
financing (AML) in the financial industry with a view for its suitability as a model for a duty of 
care standard in platform content regulation.  Before undertaking a short explanation of the AML 
legislation and its implementation, the reasons for the choice of this regulatory framework will be 
outlined briefly.  After this, the elements of the AML structure which could be adopted to duty of 
care obligations will be explained.  
It is important to state that this comparison is not meant to liken the crime of money-laundering or 
terrorist financing to unlicensed video uploads, hate speech, the online sale of fake mobile phone 
chargers or the like.  It simply analyses the technical and conceptual suitability of the AML 
management framework in view of its similarities in the transaction environment and the use of 
technology with the area of platform content management. 
There are several reasons why the AML framework lends itself to the purposes of this exercise:  
1) AML applies to a high-volume transactions environment taking place to an overwhelming 
extent by electronic means72.  In 2015, 433.1 billion non-cash transactions were recorded 
worldwide, of which over two thirds happened in the industrialised world73.  Although it is 
impossible to say how many content uploads are happening on the internet today it becomes clear 
that both areas deal with a high volume of transactions.   
                                                          
72 Shijia Gao and others, ‘Knowledge-based Anti-money Laundering: A Software Agent Bank Application’ (2009) 13 
Journal of Knowledge Management 63, 64. Although the first stage of money laundering consist of injecting 
illegitimate funds, mostly through cash transfers, into the financial system, the subsequent phases of layering 
(obscuring origin of the funds through complex transaction) and integration (the final conversion of the funds into 
the official economy) happen within the financial system and would be electronically tracked in one way or 
another.  
73 CapGemini and BNP Paribas, ‘World Payments Report 2017. A Preview into the Global Payments Landscape.’ 
(2017) 6–8. 
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2) Financial products are highly complex and innovation both in financial service products and 
means of value transfer are strong.  In addition, the circumvention techniques by fraudsters are 
constantly evolving.  Online platforms face similar challenges, caused by complexities in content 
legislation (e.g. the correct and timely identification of copyright, trademark infringements or hate 
speech, product legislation in e-commerce) and constantly evolving business models and 
technologies. 
3) AML happens in an international framework applied throughout the industrialised world, 
reflecting the globalised nature of the financial industry and capital flows74.  The global and 
cross/jurisdictional nature of the internet and online platforms does not need further referencing. 
4) Many large platforms either own or integrate electronic payment services and would already be 
involved in or even conduct AML compliance activities.75  Platforms may therefore already 
possess valuable experience which they could adapt to technical duty of care standards.  Apart 
from that platforms do already engage in fraud detection and prevention risk as part of their 
activities76. 
4.2. The AML framework – a brief overview 
By the late 1980s industrialised states had realised that money laundering had become a problem 
on a global scale which could not be tackled through domestic legislation alone.  This was mainly 
due the accelerating globalisation of capital flows, trade and the digital revolution, which 
facilitated global information exchange.  The G7 states set up the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) in 1989 to coordinate worldwide anti-money laundering efforts.  It was charged with 
                                                          
74 ‘FATF - Members and Observers’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/> accessed 22 
September 2017. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which sets standards and promotes implementation of 
anti-money laundering activities had 37 members by 2017, of which all industrialized Western nations (EU, 
Switzerland, North America, Japan) and emerging economies (BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and 
several others. 
75 Amazon Payments Europe is registered as an electronic money institution and Paypal Europe as a credit institution 
with the Luxembourg financial market regulator (CSSF), while Google Payment Ltd has an E-Money issuer license 
with the UK Financial Conduct Authority.  See also: J Bruce Richardson, ‘With Great Power Comes Little 
Responsibility: The Role of Online Payment Service Providers with Regards to Websites Selling Counterfeit Goods’ 
(2014) 12 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology <https://ojs.library.dal.ca/CJLT/article/view/6607> accessed 20 
March 2017. 
76 See for example: Markus Ruch and Stefan Sackmann, ‘Customer-Specific Transaction Risk Management in E-
Commerce’, Value creation in e-business management (Springer 2009). 
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developing standards and recommendations and with coordinating the implementation of effective 
rules to fight threats to the global financial system arising from illegal activities.  Subsequently the 
links of other illegal activities to money laundering, such as tax evasion, corruption or human 
trafficking, were also realised.  With the terror attacks of 09/11 in New York, terrorist financing 
became an additional focus area of the FATF77.  The FATF has so far issued five rounds of updated 
and adjusted guidance and recommendations between 1990 and 2012.  These are subsequently 
being introduced into national laws by its members and beyond78.  In the EU this has resulted in a 
series of four anti-money laundering directives since 1990, with the latest having been enacted in 
201579.  Not only are traditional credit and financial institutions (banks, investment funds, 
insurance companies) covered by specific obligations, but it also applies to non-financial actors 
such as casinos or real estate agents, or entities handing large cash transaction80.  A currently 
proposed Fifth Directive would see the scope of regulated entities extended to virtual currency 
platforms and anonymous payment instruments, i.e. custodian wallet providers81. 
In its beginning, the AML framework was more static, obliging regulated entities to report 
transactions or other suspicious activity according to fixed parameters or thresholds specified by 
the law82.  This rules-based system was soon perceived as too inflexible and ineffective as it did 
not consider the dynamism of risk83 in this fast-moving and complex sector.  It also did not 
                                                          
77 See for a more comprehensive historical account of the international AML system: Stavros Gadinis and Colby 
Mangels, ‘Collaborative Gatekeepers’ (2016) 73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 797, 850–874. and Maria Bergström, Karin 
Svedberg Helgesson and Ulrika Mörth, ‘A New Role for For-Profit Actors? The Case of Anti-Money Laundering and 
Risk Management: A NEW ROLE FOR FOR-PROFIT ACTORS?’ (2011) 49 JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 
1043, 1047–1050;  
78 ‘FATF Countries’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/> accessed 25 September 2017.  As per its official webpage 
190 jurisdictions have now committed to the FATF recommendations. 
79 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the 
use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing 2015. 
80 ibid. Articles 2, 3 
81 Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive (EU) 
2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist 
financing and amending Directive 2009/101/EC, COM(2016) 450 final 2016 para 1 (1). 
82 Rules typical impose reporting obligations for specified transaction over a certain threshold 
83 see also Bamberger (n 68) 707–708. on the topic on rules-based compliance systems, the ineffectiveness of 
purely rules based systems has also been pointed out by Lishan Ai and Jun Tang, ‘Risk-based Approach for 
Designing Enterprise-wide AML Information System Solution’ (2011) 18 Journal of Financial Crime 268. 
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incentivize private actors to engage in their own threat analysis84.  Following the evolvement of 
FATF recommendations, the EU introduced a risk-based approach towards anti-money laundering 
under the Third AML Directive in 200585, which was further extended by the recent Fourth 
Directive86. Under this approach financial institutions and other regulated entities are held to 
engage in ongoing transaction monitoring and risk assessment.  In the EU, financial and credit 
institutions are obliged to apply customer due diligence (CDD) measures to new customers by 
verifying their identity through document checks and establishing beneficiary ownership87.  This 
is commonly referred to as a Know-Your-Customer (KYC) process.  Secondly, under CDD they 
need to conduct ongoing transaction and client status monitoring using a risk-based approach88.  
Thirdly, where they detect activity suspicious of money laundering or terrorist financing they are 
held to report these to the national Financial Information Unit89.   
While the Fourth AML Directive essentially provides procedural requirements, it leaves the actual 
risk assessment activity largely to the regulated entities.  More technical guidance on how, for 
example, risk assessment could be effectively structured is then issued through recommendation 
and technical compliance standards by the FATF90.  Companies were given the obligations as well 
as the flexibility to perform their own risk assessment according to their product mix, customer 
                                                          
84 Katalin Ligeti and Maxime Lassalle, ‘La Quatrième Directive Anti-Blanchiment: Quels Changements Pour Le 
Luxembourg?’ (2016) 2 Revue luxembourgeoise de bancassurfinance 58. 
85 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of 
the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing 2005. 
86 Directive (EU) 2015/849 (n 79). 
87 ibid. Article 13 (1) a) -c) 
88 ibid Article 13. (1) d) This means concretely that they need to monitor any change in the risk profile of the 
customer, products, or geographic exposure and monitor transactions with a view to detecting any activity that 
could be suspected of money laundering and terrorist finance. See also ‘FATF Recommendations 2012 - 
International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation’ 
<http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf> accessed 22 
September 2017. Recommendation 10 Customer Due Diligence 
89 Directive (EU) 2015/849 (n 79). Articles 32-34.  While the 5th AMLD proposal (n 81) returns to more rules-based 
compliance measures with regards transaction with high-risk countries, it is open to debate whether the risk-based 
approach will be significantly weakened.  After looking at the proposal it is submitted here that in its core that 
approach is maintained. See in addition: Mark D Cole and Teresa Quintel, ‘“Is There Anybody out There?” – 
Retention of Communications Data. Analysis of the Status Quo in Light of the Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)’, Comparative Perspectives on 
Privacy in an Internet Era, vol VII (CAP Forthcoming) 25–27. 
90 ‘FATF Recommendations 2012 - International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism & Proliferation’ (n 88). 
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base and geographic exposure.  It was deemed more effective to allocate the risk management to 
the companies as they were dealing directly with the customer and had immediate access over all 
relevant transaction data.  This has also led to the regulated institutions developing highly 
sophisticated risk transaction monitoring software systems91.  Under the risk-based approach they 
are now moving increasingly away from entirely rules-based (red flag) transaction monitoring 
algorithms and supplement these with flexible, risk-based approaches and intelligent, self-learning 
algorithms to detect fraud patterns92. 
Meanwhile the prevalence of algorithmic decision making in the AML area has also been criticised 
over lack of (democratic) accountability and procedural transparency as it is enshrined within a 
hardly penetrable complex technical system93.  Nevertheless, while a majority of suspicious 
transaction reports is software generated, they still require human follow up, investigation and 
explanation with the regulator.  It has been argued that this would be a way to balance against 
defensive and overzealous reporting, as well as address concerns over opacity of the process94.  
Sustained regulator involvement and independent human enquiry into machine decisions could 
eventually help avoiding self-referential and unaccountable systems, and ensure transparency of 
the algorithm95. 
4.3. Structuring duty of care obligations 
As previously mentioned there are three core elements that can be distinguished in an AML 
framework: KYC, transaction monitoring (both part of CDD), and suspicious transaction 
reporting.  This paper suggests that, on a modified basis, these could be core components of a 
horizontally applied duty of care standard for online platforms.  The scope of each of these 
components could then be adapted on a sectorial level, i.e. to the type of content or type of platform 
business model.  A risk-based approach, making platforms responsible and accountable for their 
risk assessment while setting the broad parameters of such an exercise, should be another key 
element of an effective duty of care system which platforms can apply from AML.  Where 
                                                          
91 Gadinis and Mangels (n 77) 809, 882–883. 
92 Gao and others (n 72) 67–69. 
93 Bergström, Svedberg Helgesson and Mörth (n 77). Bamberger (n 68) 727–730. 
94 Gadinis and Mangels (n 77) 886–888. 
95 Bamberger (n 68). 
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platforms demonstrate compliance with the defined duty of care standard they would be exempt 
from any content liability.  In effect, the duty of care standard would replace the current liability 
regime of the ECD and eschew the current division between “active” and “passive” hosts as well 
as the dichotomy of specific and general monitoring.   
Standards in this context mean technical standards, which in a co-regulatory approach, would serve 
as a legally mandated proof of compliance, similar to the “New Approach” used by the EU 
legislator in the area of product conformity96.  Product standards rely on a similar conceptual 
approach, which is based on self-certification but may also, depending on the complexity and risk 
inherent in the product, prescribe compliance with specific technical and safety requirements 
defined through European norms.  As alluded to above, this flexibility could be applied on a 
sectoral level when adapting duty of care standards to specific technical platform models and/or 
types of content. 
It should be noted that the risk-based approach is also applied in other regulatory contexts within 
the EU.  The new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is based on such an approach97.  It 
mandates risk assessments of the data processing activities of controllers and processors, and 
prescribes data protection impact assessment and reporting requirements for high risk activities 
involving personal data98.  This fits into the wider picture of modern risk regulation99 being applied 
in areas driven by complex technologies and innovation100.  
4.3.1. KYC 
Within the AML framework the KYC process is performed to identify the customer and enable 
the application of the risk based approach101.  Identification checks, beneficiary owner and business 
purpose verification would allow the entity to decide whether enhanced, standard or simplified 
due diligence measure would need to be applied to the customer.   
                                                          
96 I am basing my approach on Spindler and Thorun (n 47) 24. and  Verbiest and others (n 17). 20-22 
97 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC 2017. 
98 ibid. For general risk assessment Articles 24(1), 25(1); for data protection impact assessment Article 35 
99 Bamberger (n 68) 673. 
100 See also the discussion in Section 3.2. 
101 Dennis Cox, Handbook of Anti-Money Laundering (Wiley 2014) ch 13. 
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The idea of KYC-style customer identification processes for intermediaries or online platforms is 
not new.  In the response to the EU Commission’s public consultation on the enforcement 
environment of intellectual property rights (IPRs), rights owners demanded that such processes be 
prescribed for intermediaries102.  Rights owners would like to see such processes on online 
platforms so that repeat defenders can be adequately sanctioned.  For rights owners themselves 
this would facilitate prosecuting sellers or uploaders for rights infringements.  The CJEU has 
provided a basis for such obligations, for example, in L’Oréal, where it required eBay to prevent 
infringements of the same kind by the same seller103.  Protection against repeat offenders requires 
the possession of the identity of the offending party.  In McFadden the CJEU concluded that 
password protection of a public W-LAN network, which required the internet user to disclose their 
identity, would be an adequate measure of dissuasion from connections which infringed copyright 
or related rights104.  In the e-commerce sector platforms may already be required to apply KYC if 
they are offering their own payments solutions for sellers and clients. 
The KYC requirement for online platforms would serve two objectives:  
1) identify customers or uploaders with a view to be able to enforce against repeat infringers and, 
depending on the type of platform content, evaluate the infringement risk exposure for the 
platform.   
2) as a deterrence against users to infringe rights.   
KYC processes should be flexibly defined according to the type of platform, or content that is 
being hosted or uploaded.  For example, customer identification requirements could be more 
comprehensive in the area of e-commerce were a contractual relationship is established between 
the platform and the seller, or where there is deeper integration into the platform, such as use 
payment or delivery services, or detailed product data upload.  By contrast, for user comments on 
a news portals, user identification criteria could be less onerous taking account of freedom of 
                                                          
102 EU Commission, ‘Summary of Responses to the Public Consultation on the Evaluation and Modernisation of the 
Legal Framework for IPR Enforcement’ (2016) 17 <http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/18661> accessed 17 
March 2017. 
103 L’Oréal v eBay (n 10) [141]. 
104 Tobias Mc Fadden  v  Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH, C‑484/14 [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:689 (CJEU) 
96. 
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expression rights.  This was confirmed in the Delfi judgement where the Court acknowledged the 
importance of user anonymity for posting comments on internet news portal.  At the same time, it 
acknowledged that different levels of anonymity may be available and appropriate and that they 
must be balanced against other rights.  Those different levels could for example, consist of a 
registration which is only visible to the ISP but ensures complete anonymity vis-a vis other users105.   
In any case, sectoral KYC obligations should be determined following a thorough balancing 
exercise with fundamental rights.  
4.3.2. Risk-based content monitoring 
The AML framework prescribes ongoing monitoring of both transactions and the business 
relationship.  The ultimate aim is to spot changes in the risk profile of a customer and to prevent 
and detect money laundering or terrorist financing activities.  
For online platforms, there would be two important ongoing monitoring stages:  
1) transaction monitoring during product/content upload;  
2) ongoing platform surveillance for infringing activity on the platform106. 
Platforms could be required to establish rules-based systems for high-risk activities and content, 
e.g. media files highly susceptible to copyright infringement, content highly likely to consist of 
hate speech or highly regulated product sectors on ecommerce platforms.  The ECD already 
requires that an ISPs must not have “actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, …, 
is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent”107 
for it to benefit from the liability exception.  In L’Oréal, this awareness was related to being a 
diligent economic operator108.  Similarly, German courts have asked peer-to-peer and video sharing 
platforms to check content on their site pre-emptively depending on the availability of effective 
filter technology and depending on the susceptibility of their business model to infringing uses109.  
                                                          
105 See for example in: Delfi AS v Estonia, no 65469/09 (ECtHR (Grand Chamber)). [147] – [149] 
106 This may still be possible in order to detect any infringements that may not have been captured during upload, 
modifications of content online, or when risk profile adjustments require additional sweeps. 
107 ECD (n 2). Article 14 (1) 
108 L’Oréal v eBay (n 10) [120]. 
109 Sharehoster II, 5 U 111/08 (2009) openJur 2009, 1105 (OLG Hamburg) [137]; GEMA v YouTube, 310 O 461/10 
(2012) openJur 2012, 36010 (LG Hamburg) [125–127]. 
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The effectiveness and adequacy of technology monitoring for illegal live streams was also 
discussed in the recent Football Association Premier League case in the UK110. Courts have started 
to consider more routinely the role of filtering systems or other proactive measures in preventing 
infringing content and activity with regards to hate speech and defamatory content.  For example, 
in the UK Google’s ability in light of “existing technology” to block privacy-infringing images 
and its compatibility with Article 15 ECD has been discussed111. In Austria and Germany courts 
have made similar deliberations with regards to hate speech and defamatory content on 
Facebook112.  Finally, in Delfi the ECHR engaged in a more detailed assessment on the proactive 
filtering measures and risk assessment activities targeted at preventing illegal hate speech that can 
be expected of an online news portal113. Other emerging case law across EU Member States could 
be analysed for prevention and filtering obligations with a view to use them for duty of care 
standards regarding filtering and infringement prevention114.  In China courts have made 
platforms’ “red flag” knowledge of popular video content, which was more at risk of being 
infringed, and the deployment of subsequent (risk-based) content filtering subject to duty of care 
requirements115.  This is similar to demands made by Citron et al in the US, who argue that 
platforms’ “good faith” efforts to proactively identify and restrict abusive content should 
automatically confer liability onto them under the Communications Decency Act116.   
A duty of care standard in content monitoring could ask platforms to demonstrate that they have 
performed a risk assessment of possible infringing uses of their platform and assessed and 
classified the legal risk related to their content.  They would then need to demonstrate that they 
have adapted the use of prevention and filtering measures using a risk-based approach.   
                                                          
110 The Football Association Premier League Ltd v British Telecommunications Plc & Ors [2017] 2017 EWHC 480 Ch 
(England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division)) [52, 64–68]. 
111 Glawischnig-Piesczek, C-18/18 (n 24) [49–54]. 
112In Austria:  Inanspruchnahme des Host-Providers: Entfernung von Hasspostings in sozialen Netzwerken, 5 R 5/17t 
[2017] GRUR Int 2017 800 (OLG Wien) [10–11]. In Germany:  Haftung eines sozialen Netzwerkes für durch Dritte 
hochgeladene ehrverletzende Inhalte, 11 O 2338/16 UVR [2017] MMR 2017 347 (LG Würzburg).  
113 Delfi AS v. Estonia, no. 65469/09 (n 105) [62, 122, 129, 155–159]. 
114 Leistner (n 31). 
115 Jie Wang, ‘Development of Hosting ISPs’ Secondary Liability for Primary Copyright Infringement in China – As 
Compared to the US and German Routes’ (2015) 46 IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law 275, 284–286. 
116 Citron and Wittes (n 37) 15. Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) s 230(c) (1). 
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A methodology for such a risk-based filtering could see a risk classification of the types of speech 
or user-generated-content most susceptible to being unlawful.  The advantage of a risk based 
approach to filtering is that it does not require monitoring of the entire platform’s content.  It would 
only be directed at activities that correspond to a certain risk profile.   The filtering intensity could 
also vary according to risk profile.  In practice, this could mean filtering of content by subject 
categories, keywords, or other criteria.  Some of the approaches listed under Section 3 could be 
utilized, such as a context-based risk classifications in social media117, paired with specific content 
flags.  If combined with a follow-the-money approach, this could help in sustainably reducing the 
financially viability of infringers118. 
Platforms and other ISPs are already engaging in these kinds of risk management, filtering and 
detection activities119. These systems are integrated into holistic company risk management 
activities, such as fraud or payment risks120, and draw their data from areas across the company 
(financial/revenue, customer, product, supply chain data)121.  Mandating a risk-based approach to 
prevention through transaction monitoring, and setting broad framework conditions for its 
application could be a way of dragging existing filter algorithms into the light.  If platforms were 
required to explain the risk assessment, the ensuing choice and scope of prevention and filtering 
technology as well as the operational procedures to regulators, this could create the kind of 
transparency which is currently needed122.  That transparency is in danger of being eroded, 
however, by pushing for self-regulated, industry owned infringement prevention solutions123. 
But even in a co-regulated, technical risk management system there remain accountability and 
abuse challenges.  These complex filtering algorithms will execute on a multitude of embedded 
                                                          
117 Lavi (n 41). 
118 EU Commission, ‘Promoting a Fair, Efficient and Competitive European Copyright-Based Economy in the Digital 
Single Market, COM(2016) 592 Final’ 9–10.  The follow-the-money approach aims at cutting the revenue stream 
connected to infringing activities on the internet.  Under this, intermediaries such as payment service providers or 
online advertising services which facilitate revenue generation on websites with illegal content would be brought 
on board to intercept these activities. 
119 Friedmann (n 24); Wang (n 115). In addition, the activities of YouTube or other platforms on employing content 
filtering technologies are well known and do not need further elaboration.  
120 Gadinis and Mangels (n 77) 885–886. Demonstrate how AML activities are integrated in wider fraud detection 
activities of companies.  
121 Ruch and Sackmann (n 76). 
122 Bamberger (n 68). 
123 As discussed in Section 3.2. 
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normative choices and legal norms which cannot be grasped easily by regulators or users124.  It 
will therefore be important to require obligatory, periodic algorithm audits, by which human beings 
review the technical decisions made by the filtering algorithms, to ensure compliance with legal 
norms and warrant against automation bias and abuse125.  This review could for example be done 
by independent auditors or by technically skilled and specialised regulators. 
4.3.3. Platform enforcement and reporting 
Under the AML framework, transactions proven or suspected of money laundering or terrorist 
financing need to be reported to regulatory authorities.  Since the fight against money laundering 
is considered a matter of public interest126 this appears to be appropriate.  Reporting of suspicious 
transactions on this scale is unlikely to be warranted however around content liability, which in 
most cases falls under civil law and torts127.  For example, as stated in Promusicae, Member States 
cannot be obliged to lay down obligations to communicate personal data in civil proceedings 
related to copyright infringements128.  Moreover, member states must ensure they apply a 
balancing exercise with fundamental rights when being confronted with requests for personal data 
as regards alleged infringers129.   
However, the ability to enforce effectively against infringers remains essential for a well-
functioning duty of care standard.  This third component of a duty of care regime could therefore 
be used to define and standardise ex post measures that platforms would need to comply with.  
There could be three distinct elements: 
1) Automated takedown conditions: content filtering systems will be designed to take down 
infringing content automatically.  In fact, these systems exist already and they are deployed by a 
                                                          
124 Bamberger (n 68) 737–738. 
125 ibid. 
126 DIirective (EU) 2015/849 (n 6). Recital 42, Article 43 
127  Counterfeiting in e-commerce could be an exception, as this may be linked to organized crime or anti-money 
laundering.  Where this is the case a duty of care standard could include a reporting requirement to that effect in 
very limited circumstances and under a strict balancing exercise. 
128 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España SAU, C‑275/06 [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:54 
(CJEU) [58–60]. 
129 ibid 66–68. 
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number of platforms130.  However, it is important for safeguarding of due process and user rights 
that there are defined and harmonised criteria for automated takedown.  These harmonized and 
standardized criteria would include requirements for contacting affected parties (e.g. timing, 
message content) and the modalities for counter claims.   
2) Notice and Takedown (NTD) criteria: NTD relies on third parties, such as users, authorities or 
rightsholders, to inform platforms of allegedly infringing content.  Under current EU law the ISP 
would need to remove expeditiously infringing content of which it has been notified131.  However, 
the ECD does not set any more detailed or harmonised criteria for NTD.  The EU Commission is 
currently reviewing whether there is a need for Europe-wide NTD processes132.  In its public 
consultation on online platforms 70% of respondents argued for sector specific NTD regimes133. 
Typical criteria that could be defined in such a standard are: notification modalities (e.g. the 
technical means – web forms, email; who can send it); notice content (e.g. the detail of information 
provided, declarations of perjury etc.); processing modalities (e.g. maximum handling time, 
platform information to notice providers and other stakeholders); counter notice requirements. 
3) Reporting: compliance reporting requirements are standard in many legal areas, including in 
AML134.  In complex technical environments reporting may make it easier to demonstrate 
compliance in an understandable way to the public, regulator or political representatives135.  
However, mandatory compliance reporting also has the additional value of reducing conflicts of 
interest and fostering a compliance culture within the company.  These effects will be enhanced 
when coupled with the promise of immunity136.  The duty of care reporting requirements could 
                                                          
130 A cases in point is Google’s ContentID filtering software.  ‘How Content ID Works’ 
<https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en> accessed 28 September 2017. 
131 ECD (n 2). 
132 EU Commission, ‘Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market Opportunities and Challenges for Europe 
COM(2016) 288 Final’ 9. 
133 EU Commission, ‘Synopsis Report on the Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment For Platforms, 
Online Intermediaries and the Collaborative Economy’ 17 <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/results-public-consultation-regulatory-environment-platforms-online-intermediaries-data-and> 
accessed 29 March 2017. 
134 In the EU statutory reporting requirements are imposed by the REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation 
and Restriction of Chemicals), health and safety regulation, labour law, tax law and for statistical purposes, to 
name but a few. 
135 Cohen (n 54) 406. 
136 Gadinis and Mangels (n 77). 
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include data on the number of: takedowns (automated and notified) in any desired detail, counter 
claims and their success rate, user accounts suspended or other sanctions, actions against repeat 
infringers.  Whether these metrics are public or shared between industry and regulator would need 
to be subject to the type of content and the public interest involved.  This could for example replace 
or supplement the rather exclusive information sharing requirements between rightsholders and 
platforms proposed in the recent Copyright Directive proposal137.  By contrast, the recent 
Commission communication on tackling illegal content on the internet, which encourages 
standardized notice and takedown transparency reporting 138 is a useful step in the right direction. 
4.4. Limitations and risks 
There are also limitations to the proposed duty of care standard which should be mentioned. For 
one, standardization is initially a time-consuming process and technology and market 
developments may over-run it.  However, once in place the advantage of the solution proposed 
here is that it is adaptable.  Secondly, co-regulatory solutions could also lead to a lack of procedural 
legitimacy if highly technical industry and regulator groups work in exclusive circles whereby the 
former set the tone and direction of the standard setting process due to their intimate technical 
knowledge139.  A possibly remedy proposed in this article would consist of mandatory, regular 
reporting and external audits in order to make the standard developments process transparent and 
accountable.  Lastly, there also competition concerns if the standard setting is dominated by 
leading platforms, hindering new market entrants to prosper.140.  Elevating existing technical risk 
management systems for infringement prevention, developed by leading platforms, to a state-of-
the art standard for the entire sector could pose high entry barriers for new, small ISPs.  It has been 
argued that, if smaller players were forced to adopt or compete with Google (YouTube) or 
Facebook’s existing technologies for identifying e.g. copyright infringing or hate speech content, 
they would not be able to enter the market141.  A possible strategy could involve designing 
                                                          
137 Copyright Directive Proposal (n 25).  Recital 38 
138 EU Commission, ‘Tackling Illegal Content Online Towards an Enhanced Responsibility of Online Platforms, 
COM(2017) 555 Final’ (n 3) 16. 
139 Marsden (n 7) 4. 
140 Cohen (n 54) 395. A process called “deep capture” 
141 See for example: Nolte and Wimmers (n 24) 22–23., ‘Copyright Reform: Open Letter from European Research 
Centres’ (24 February 2017) <http://bit.ly/2loFISF> accessed 3 March 2017. 
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“sandbox” approaches to the use of filtering technology.  Regulatory sandboxes are considered in 
highly innovative and fast-moving sectors of industries subject to more complex and technical 
regulatory requirements142.  According to this, smaller, innovative market entrants are exempt from 
the more onerous regulatory provisions of established market players.  They would be allowed to 
develop and test their products or services with a view to exploring the impact of regulation143.  An 
example is the recent German law obliging social media companies to identify and takedown hate 
speech144.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper demonstrated that there is an emerging opinion that new, normative duties of care, 
could be a way forward to involving platforms consistently in efforts to prevent and remove 
infringing content online.  These duties of care should be adaptable to the type of content or 
platform design.  While the borders between protectable “passive” and liable “active” 
intermediaries are disappearing in practice, Article 15 ECD could be seen as a formidable obstacle 
to formulating more proactive infringement prevention rules.  However, this paper also tried to 
demonstrate that the justifications for Article 15, which dates back to the early days of the internet 
economy, were motivated by a desire to protect a nascent industry.  These economic justifications 
may be outdated today as the platform economy has come of age.  Moreover, courts can perform 
effective balancing exercises between rights protection of online content and fundamental rights 
of users/uploaders without the use of Article 15.  Meanwhile, the term “general monitoring” is too 
unspecific to be applied in a meaningful way to today’s platform risk management systems.  
Notwithstanding this, there are various proposals both from academia and the EU to create duty of 
care style infringement prevention obligations.  Most of these relate to specific content sectors or 
                                                          
142 A more detailed discussion of the application of the a regulatory sandbox approach in the Fintech sector can be 
found at: Dirk A Zetzsche and others, ‘Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation’ 
(2017) 2017 University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3018534> accessed 8 
January 2018. 
143 EU Commission, ‘Fintech: A More Competitive and Innovative European Financial Sector, Consultation 
Document’ 16–17 <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-fintech-consultation-document_en_0.pdf> 
accessed 9 January 2018. 
144 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken 2017 (BGBl I S 3352 (Nr 61)).  Article 1, 
Para 1, Section 2. This law exempts social networks with less than 2 million domestic users from key reporting and 
duty of care requirements relating to identifying and removing infringing content requirements.   
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platform designs.  They are a mixed bag of self and co-regulatory measures, and not all proposals 
appear to consciously select a certain type of governance model.  The EU Commission has 
currently opted for self-regulatory solutions.  Whether this is the best choice is questionable.  While 
there is a natural drift for self-regulatory solutions in highly technical, fast moving and innovative 
sectors, they have major drawbacks, such as democratic legitimacy and automation bias influenced 
by commercial interest scope creep and self-referentiality.  This paper suggests that a co-regulatory 
model, by which industry and regulators are mandated to create risk management standards, is a 
better way forward.  The current AML framework is presented as a possible model for designing 
such a duty of care standard.  There are notable similarities in the financial transaction and online 
content management sectors which lend themselves to this analogy.  The duty of care standard for 
preventing infringing content could be structured along the current AML framework.  It would 
impose three elements: KYC, content monitoring, and enforcement and reporting obligations.  The 
standard would follow a risk-based approach, asking platforms to engage in transparent and 
auditable risk assessments of their business model and content following a mandated risk 
management framework.  These frameworks could be adapted to different sectors, depending on 
type of content or platform design.  Depending on the risk classification, platforms would then 
need to implement processes which effectively address the risks.  Platforms would be given freer 
choice regarding the operational and technological means with which they address these risks.  
Finally, harmonised NTD procedures could be part of the enforcement component of such a 
standard.  Transparency and democratic accountability of such a standard would be safeguarded 
by regulator involvement in the standard setting process, and regular compliance reporting and 
external audit requirements. 
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